interest they would have at least as much to gain by a transfer from the French
economy to the German.
8. In these circumstances they are unlikely to submit tamely to a suppression by the
Saar Government of the pro-German political parties and newspapers such as
would be involved by a return to the status quo.
9. We should thus have a position of deadlock, with the majority of the Saar
population indignantly opposed to their Government but lacking any means of constitutional
self-expression until the Landtag elections of 1957. In these circumstances
the incitement which can be expected from non-official German organisations
across the border would create an explosive situation, with possibilities of
strikes, unrest and violence. The Saar police would be quite unequal to maintaining
order in such circumstances. The international gendarmerie proposed by the Referendum
Commission would, even if authorised, by definition only have the task
of keeping order during the Referendum process, not after it. We would thus be
inexorably led towards a situation where disorders in the Saar could only be
prevented by the intervention of French troops.
The International Aspect
10. While we can count on Dr, Adenauer’s influence to be used in the cause of moderation,
the Federal Government would be certainly under pressure to display
sympathy with the Saarlanders against their Government and the French. As in the
debate on the Saar Statute early this year, an unholy alliance of right wing Free
Democrats and the S.P.D. opposition can be expected to gather around the
nationalist drum as soon as the Saar question becomes acute.
11. We should thus find ourselves with the beginnings of a major Franco-German
row just when the Geneva Conference was starting, i.e. at the moment when the
unity of the Western side was especially important. Just about the same time diplomatic
relations between Moscow and Bonn would very likely have been established.
With the Geneva Conference in progress, the advantage to Russia of the
trouble-making possibilities of the Saar would be at its height, and the new direct
line between Bonn and Moscow would give them an extra channel for exploiting
the situation. In short, as things have worked out, the timing of the Saar Referendum
could not be more unfortunate. If the Federal Republic is dissatisfied with
what happens next, it will have the Russians at its elbow. If the French have cause
to consider themselves tricked, or even disappointed, by their Western allies over
the Saar, this, coming on top of their difficulties in North Africa, may imperil the
position ot the Government and strengthen the forces working for a neutralist
Government, perhaps of Front Populaire type.
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