from Rhineland Pfalz, and therefore feels strongly about the Saar - took all this in
quite good part, and did not attempt to deny the existence of the Junktim. On the
other hand he continued to argue on familiar FDP lines against the Saar Agreement
maintaining that it was unjust to expect the Germans, in return for having to raise
an Army of twelve Divisions, which they did not wish to do, to have to give up a
million Germans to the French etc. etc. He complained that the Paris Agreement
was virtually a final settlement of the Saar question, and that there was no way in
which the Saarlanders, if they so desired, either now or later on, could opt for
reunion with Germany. Monsieur Berard, who was also at dinner, and I did our
best to contradict these arguments, but I am not sure that we had much effect on
Neumayer. However, I think he did appreciate existence of the Junktim and the fact
that all the Treaties must be regarded as standing together.
When I saw Blankenhom this morning I told him of my talk with Neumayer. He
expressed appreciation and said he was particularly glad that I had rubbed in the
point about the Junktim. I said I would of course speak in similar terms to any of
the other FDP people whom I might happen to meet. I have been wondering,
however, if it would be useful if, in addition I took any special steps to get hold of
Dehler, who was normally not easy to contact, in order to make sure that he was
under no misapprehension as to the British views regarding the Paris Agreements.
We were most anxious to help in this matter, and anxious too that there should be
no misunderstanding where the United Kingdom stood in the matter. At the same
time 1 was conscious of the importance of doing nothing which could give Dehler
and his friends an excuse for saying that they had been subjected to undue pressure.
What did Blankenhorn think the Chancellor’s views on this point would be? Would
he feel that for us to speak to Dehler would do more harm than good?
Blankenhom thanked me for what I had said and said that he would certainly have
a word with the Chancellor on the subject. His own view, with which he was pretty
certain the Chancellor would agree, was that at the moment it would be better for
us not to take any special steps to speak to Dehler about the Saar. It would be better
to wait until we saw how Blankenhom got on at his next round of talks with Soutou
and how the Chancellor’s meeting with the Ministersprasident on December 1 went
off. Of course if any of us should run into Dehler, it would be all to the good if we
were to speak to him about the Junktim on the same lines as I had spoken to
Neumayer.
I shall be seeing Dr. Conant the day after tomorrow and will try and remember to
tell him all about this. In the meantime as the matter was mentioned to Mr.
Shaugnessy the other day, perhaps either Mr. Allen or Mr. Johnston, if they should
be seeing him in the next day or two, could tell him of my conversation with
Blankenhorn.
477