Nr.  72
Britische  Einflussnahme  auf  die  bundesdeutsche  Saarpolitik

Am  22.  November  berichtete  der  britische  Botschafter  über  seine  Bemühungen,  auf
die  innenpolitischen  Entscheidungsprozesse  in  der  Bundesrepublik,  insbesondere
innerhalb  der  FDP,  Einfluss  zu  nehmen.  Gleichzeitig  erläuterte  er  die  Gründe,  die
gegen  eine  weitergehende  Einflussnahme  der  Alliierten  in  diesem  Zusammenhang
sprachen,  und  leitete  Signale  hinsichtlich  der  Möglichkeit  einer  Regierungsumbildung
  in  Bonn  weiter.
Bericht  des  britischen  Hochkommissars  in  Bonn  Frederick  Hoyer  Miliar
an  das  britische  Außenministerium,  confidential.
22.11.1954
National  Archives  -  Foreign  Office,  FO  371/109609/CW  1081/540.
The  Saar
It  was  suggested  in  a  minute  the  other  day  that  in  view  of  the  deterioration  in  the
internal  situation,  thanks  to  the  attitude  of  the  FDP,  it  would  be  a  good  idea  if  Dr.
Conant  and  1  were  to  take  suitable  opportunities  of  speaking  to  Dehler  and  others,
and  of  trying  to  persuade  them  to  adopt  a  more  reasonable  line.  The  idea  was  that  if
Dr.  Conant  thought  this  was  a  good  idea,  we  should  first  make  sure  from  the
Chancellor  that  he  did  not  think  that  any  such  intervention  on  our  part  would  do
more  harm  than  good,  and  that  it  would  not  give  Dehler  an  opportunity  of
suggesting  that  he  had  been  subjected  to  Anglo-American  pressure.
I  intended  to  take  an  early  opportunity  of  talking  to  Dr,  Conant  about  this,  but  in
the  meantime  I  was  able  to  speak  to  Neumayer,  the  FDP  Minister  of  Justice,  when
he  came  to  dinner  with  us  on  November  20.  I  did  my  best  to  convince  Neumayer
that,  however  much  the  FDP  might  talk  about  separating  the  Saar  Agreement  from
the  other  Paris  texts,  and  approving  the  latter  while  delaying  action  on  the  former,
the  fact  was  that  the  French  regarded  all  the  Agreements  as  forming  one  package,
and  would  certainly  not  agree  to  terminate  the  Occupation  or  to  admit  Germany
into  NATO  as  long  as  the  position  of  the  Saar  was  undecided.  If,  therefore,  the
FDP  carried  their  opposition  to  the  Saar  Agreement  to  the  extent  of  ensuring  its
rejection  by  the  Bundestag,  this  would  mean  that  none  of  the  Treaties  would  come
into  force.  Apart  from  the  very  unfortunate  consequences  that  this  would  have  on
the  German  internal  situation,  it  would  put  the  Germans  in  a  very  difficult  position
vis-a-vis  international  opinion,  which  would  look  on  them  in  much  the  same  way  as
they  had  regarded  the  French  three  months  ago.  Neumayer  -  who  of  course  comes

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