Nevertheless it is desirable that the Americans and ourselves should know where
we stand and have an agreed view. Some months ago we worked out with the State
Department a paper setting forth the agreed U.K./U.S. position on the Saar
problem. The text of this paper is at Annex B. The idea was that these proposals
should form the basis of any joint Anglo/American intervention designed fo
facilitate a settlement. These proposals have not yet been put forward and appear in
some respects to require revision, in the light of the Franco/German discussions
that have taken place since they were drawn up. Suggestions for the revision of the
original U.K./U.S. proposals are attached at Annex C.
Future Action
The Secretary of State will no doubt wish to discuss the situation on the above lines
with Mr. Acheson. It might be suggested to Mr. Acheson that there would now
seem to be little utility in our attempting to force a settlement on the French and
Germans before the Saar elections have taken place. It seems necessary to wait until
the elections are over and then to concentrate on pressing both sides to resume
negotiations. Should they still seem reluctant to do so and should it appear that
suggestions from ourselves and the Americans would not be unwelcome, then we
might put forward the joint U.K./U.S. proposals, modified somewhat on the lines of
the suggestions at Annex C. If Mr. Acheson agrees, British and American officials
might meanwhile be working out the text of such revised proposals.
The Secretary of State might also discuss with Mr. Acheson the Franco-German
proposal (see paragraph of text 4 in Annex A) for a guarantee of any Franco-German
settlement „by all the interested states“. We were given to understand in
the course of the Franco-German discussions that this phrase was intended to include
the U.S. and Great Britain. Our own attitude has hitherto been that we cannot
be regarded as committed by anything agreed upon between the French and Germans
and must clearly be given an opportunity of considering what the settlement
is which we are being asked to guarantee and what committments our guarantee
would involve. We should not wish, however, to rule out in advance all possibility
of a U.K. guarantee in some form, particularly if this seemed to be an important
factor in bringing about Franco-German agreement.
In any discussions of the Saar problem with M. Schuman in New York, the
Secretary of State will no doubt wish to express the strong hope that, even if no
further progress can be made towards reaching agreement with the Germans before
the Saar elections, then a serious effort will be made to reach such agreement as
soon as possible after the elections have taken place. In particular it would seem to
be a great mistake to defer any attempt to reach a settlement until after next year’s
elections in Germany.
{FKRJ
448
