12.  If  these  enquiries  failed,  as  1  should  fear,  to  elicit  any  novel  or  promising  proposal
  it  might  prove  necessary  to  state  candidly  to  the  French  Government  that  we
feel  their  policy  in  the  Saar  is  doomed  to  failure,  and  is  likely  if  continued
increasingly  to  hamper  and  thwart  the  development  of  stable  relationship  in
Western  Europe.  We  feel  therefore  that  it  is  up  to  the  French  Government  to  take
the  initiative  in  making  proposals  for  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem.  If  those
proposals  seemed  to  us  fair  and  reasonable,  and  likely  to  offer  the  prospect  of  a
lasting  settlement  of  this  issue  between  France  and  Germany,  we  should  certainly
be  prepared  to  use  all  our  influence  to  secure  their  acceptance  by  the  latter.  But  we
should  warn  the  French  Government  that  the  longer  they  delay  the  higher  the  German
  price  is  likely  to  rise.  We  should  draw  their  attention  to  the  fact  that  more  and
more  in  Germany  the  object  of  policy  is  to  secure  the  holding  of  a  plebiscite  to
decide  the  fate  of  the  Saar.  Such  a  plebiscite  might  indeed  be  the  logical  way  of
settling  the  issue;  and  if  the  French  Government  are,  as  we  suppose,  confident  that
its  outcome  would  endorse  their  policy  they  may  feel  no  particular  anxiety  at  the
prospect.  But  a  plebiscite,  whatever  its  outcome,  is  bound  to  raise  passion  and
leave  resentment  behind;  and  while  recognising  that  there  may  be  no  alternative,  in
the  long  run,  to  such  a  measure  we  should  hope  that  the  French  Government  might
be  able  to  forestall  its  necessity  by  proposing  a  solution  which,  while  safeguarding
France’s  economic  and  security  requirements,  takes  full  account  of  German  national
  interests,  of  the  linguistic  and  cultural  affiliations  of  the  population  of  the  Saar
and  of  their  desire  for  self-determination.
13.  It  is  my  hope  that  you  will  consider  not  so  much  the  details,  which  may  seem
over-elaborate,  of  the  above  suggested  approach  to  the  French  Government  as  the
general  concept  that  such  an  approach  might  be  made.  The  details  I  venture  to  put
forward  principally  by  way  of  illustration  of  a  possible  method  and  of  those  considerations
  which,  seen  from  Germany,  appear  most  relevant.  The  concept  however
I  feel  obliged  to  recommend  to  your  attention  for  this  is  perhaps  the  most  critical
aspect  of  Germany’s  relations  with  her  Western  neighbours  and  we  cannot  avoid,
now  that  the  matter  has  been  raised  in  broad  terms  by  the  Federal  Chancellor’s
note,  re-examining  our  attitude  towards  it.
I  am  sending  copies  of  this  despatch  to  His  Majesty’s  Representatives  in  Paris  and
Washington.
I  have  the  honour  to  be,  with  the  highest  respect,
Sir,  Your  most  obedient,  humble  Servant.
{Ivone  Kirkpatrick}

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