first time of ,,a peace treaty or an arrangement of the nature of a peace treaty“, thus
suggesting that the French Government may contemplate some earlier arrangement.
5. It is not for me to examine the motives underlying the Saar policy of the French
Government. It will be sufficient to say that the occasions in the past two years
when events in the Saar have disturbed Franco-German relations have been so unfortunate
and untimely that it is only possible to interpret the actions of the French
Government and the Saarbrücken regime as having been prompted by the direst
necessity for immediate action. Moreover, the large corpus of coercive legislation
which has been built up in the Saar territory suggests that the Saar Government
must have doubts of its ability to sustain its position by normal democratic means.
For these reasons it occurs to me that the French Government may not be found unreceptive
to such advice as we may have to offer.
6. From the German side also the evidence points to the desirability of arresting the
present course of developments. The Saar question has in the past eighteen months
become alike one of the greatest single threats to the survival of Dr. Adenauer’s
government and the principal point of friction in the Federal Republic’s foreign
relations.
7. The renunciation, at all events in advance of a peace treaty, of German territory
within the 1937 frontiers would be impossible for any German Government at the
present time, however strong. For a government as precarious as the present one,
hampered by the inherent weaknesses of the Federal system imposed by the Basic
Law, harried by a tough and vociferous opposition and handicapped by the
necessity of creating no precedent affecting the Eastern territories, any act of
renunciation would spell defeat. In the Saar question, faced with solid support for
the opposition in the country and in the press, the Chancellor cannot afford to be
backward in representing German interests. The banning of the Democratic Party
of the Saar has created the impression that the Saar Government’s action is
designed to prevent even the free discussion of the possibility of reunion of the
Saar with Germany.
8. The Chancellor’s foreign policy is founded, more than on anything else, upon a
desire to establish the unity of Europe upon a solid basis of Franco-German cooperation.
The execution of this policy has been dogged by difficulties arising
directly from the Saar problem. The signature of the Franco-Saar Conventions
delayed and came close to frustrating German accession to the Statute of the Council
of Europe. The signature of the Schuman Plan Treaty was only achieved at the
last moment by the Schuman-Adenauer exchange of letters and the exclusion of the
Saar territory from the signature of the treaty. The present crisis imperils the early
ratification of the treaty by the Bundestag. I hope that the Chancellor will be able to
push the ratification through, but it is clear that the Social Democratic Party will
now be encouraged to fight ratification every inch of the way.
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