bcrship  for  the  Saar,  insisted  on  signing  the  Saar  conventions  as  well.  That  was  a
comparatively  simple  issue  as  German  interest  and  German  inclinations  pointed
unmistakably  towards  the  desirability  of  accession.  Yet,  though  the  Chancellor  is
basically  pro-French  and  devoted  to  Franco-German  understanding,  the  issue  hung
for  weeks  in  the  balance,  and  it  took  our  assurance  that  the  status  of  the  Saar  was
strictly  provisional,  and  the  fortuitous  emergence  of  the  Schuman  plan,  to  get  the
accession  through  the  Bundestag.  Schumacher  and  the  SPD  were  then  capitalising
merely  the  natural  resentment  at  the  surrender  of  German  territory,  and  their
opposition  was  tactital  in  character  and  never  seriously  calculated  to  upset  the
„European“  aims  of  the  Chancellor’s  policy  which  the  SPD  shares.
The  position  is  now  greatly  different.  German  opinion  stands  irresolute  and  divided
in  the  face  of  the  remilitarisation  issue.  The  SPD,  emboldened  by  months  of
successful  harassing  of  the  Government,  are  exploiting  this  cleavage  at  every
opportunity.  The  Chancellor,  rocked  by  shortages  and  threatened  strikes  at  home,
handicapped  by  an  economy  policy  which  lays  him  open  to  constant  attack  from
the  Left,  and  uncertain  even  of  his  own  supporters,  could  never  afford  at  this
juncture  to  show  any  compliance  with  French  plans  in  the  Saar.  Moreover  his  personal
  attitude  towards  France  has  changed  a  bit  for  the  worse,  and  he  is  now  deeply
suspicious  of  French  intentions.
If  the  Saar  issue  has  kept  clear  of  the  headlines  in  recent  months,  it  is  because  it  has
been  continually  overshadowed  by  events  of  greater  urgency.  But  it  is  always
present  in  German  minds,  and  you  will  remember  that  even  in  ratifying  the  Strasbourg
  convention  on  Human  Rights  the  Chancellor  felt  obliged  to  record  a  formal
and  offensive  reservation  about  the  right  of  the  Saar  to  sign.
My  conclusion  is  that  if  Adenauer  is  faced  at  this  stage  with  a  further  French  move
in  the  direction  of  asserting  Saar  independence  he  will  have  no  alternative  but  to
come  out  flatfooted  against  it  and  that  the  prospects  of  German  collaboration  with
the  West  at  least  for  the  time  being  will  be  very  seriously  diminished.
As  a  small  indication  of  how  seriously  the  Germans  feel  on  this  question,  I  would
draw  your  attention  to  the  story,  originating  apparently  from  the  Manchester
Guardian  correspondent  in  Saarbrücken  and  reported  in  the  German  press,  to  the
effect  that  the  Saar-Minister-President,  Hoffman  [sic],  had  offered  to  raise  a  contribution
  for  the  defence  of  Europe  provided  that  the  independence  of  the  Saar  were
guaranteed.  The  story  adds  that  His  Majesty’s  Government  and  the  United  States
Government  had  been  consulted  and  approved  Hoffman’s  [sic]  plan.  Newspaper
comment  (written  before  the  denial  in  London  that  His  Majesty’s  Government  had
been  consulted)  states  that  the  news  has  been  received  in  Bonn  with  general  disquiet.
  The  comment  added  that  even  though  the  French  might  have  agreed  to  such  a
proposal  in  order  to  attain  independence  for  the  Saar  it  was  inconceivable  that

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