Full text : Das Saarland zwischen Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa

3.  He  complains  that  if  the  Saar  parliament  should  decide  on  union  with  the  Federal
Republic,  the  Ambassador  could  annul  the  decision.  But  this  is  right  an  indeed  inevitable,
  if  as  Dr.  Adenauer  claims,  no  final  decision  in  regard  to  the  future  of  the
Saar  can  properly  be  taken  before  the  Peace  Treaty.
4.  He  attacks  the  Mines  Agreement  on  the  ground  that  it  confers  an  enormous
property  on  France.  The  fact  is  that  the  French  intended  to  take  a  50  years  lease  of
the  mines,  a  proceeding  to  which  Dr.  Adenauer  strongly  objected.  In  deference  to
British  and  American  representations  the  French  abandoned  this  plan  in  favour  of
one  which  gives  them  the  right  to  exploit  the  mines  until  the  Peace  Treaty  and  a  50
year  lease  only  if  the  agreement  is  upheld  by  a  Peace  Treaty.  This  modification  Dr.
Adenauer  how  brushes  aside  as  being  of  no  consequence.
5.  Dr.  Adenauer  states  that  the  British  Government  had  declared  that  they  had  not
been  kept  informed  of  developments.  No  such  declaration  has  been  made  and  in
fact  the  British  Government  has  been  in  close  touch  with  the  French  Government
and  has  succeeded  in  securing  modifications  in  the  terms  of  the  agreements  to
Germany’s  advantage.
6.  Dr.  Adenauer  seeks  to  draw  an  analogy  between  the  Saar  and  the  provinces
beyond  the  Oder-Neisse  line.  There  is  of  course  no  analogy.  In  the  first  place  the
Saar  is  not  being  de-Germanised.  From  a  humanitarian,  social  and  political  point  of
view  this  is  of  prime  importance.  Secondly,  whilst  the  Poles  intend  to  annex  the
Eastern  provinces,  the  French  have  disclaimed  any  intention  of  annexing  the  Saar.
Consequently  the  situation  of  the  Saar  as  a  prospective  member  of  the  Council  of
Europe  is  different  and  infinitely  preferable.
There  are  moreover  some  general  considerations  which  should  govern  the  attitude
of  His  Majesty’s  Government  in  this  unfortunate  dispute.
1.  Whilst  I  regret  that  the  French  should  have  chosen  this  moment  and  this  particular
  method  to  put  their  position  in  the  Saar  on  a  contractual  basis,  it  is  undeniable
that  the  British  and  United  States  Government  agreed  in  principle  at  Moscow  to  the
detachment  of  the  Saar  from  Germany  until  the  Peace  Treaty.  The  present  agreements
  whilst  they  call  attention  to  this  situation  do  not  materially  alter  it.
2.  Dr.  Adenauer’s  statement  to  the  press  expresses  the  hope  that  he  can  mobilise
the  British  and  United  States  Governments  against  the  agreements.  It  is,  however,
clear  that  even  if  we  were  so  foolish  as  to  allow  the  Germans  to  drive  a  wedge
between  us,  there  is  in  fact  no  prospect  that  we  should  succeed  in  inducing  the
French  Government  who  have  already  met  our  representations  to  scrap  the
agreements.
3.  If  Germany  wishes  the  Saar  eventually  to  return  to  the  Reich,  her  best  chance
lies  in  accepting  the  principle  of  Saar  autonomy  and  by  a  policy  of  close  cooperation
  with  the  West  securing  for  the  Saar  the  right  of  self-determination.
4.  From  this  point  of  view  alone  the  refusal  of  Germany  to  enter  the  Council  of
Europe  is  likely  to  be  damaging  to  her  prospects.  It  would  be  a  mistake  for  the

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