Germany. But any public statement if made should not enter into any detailed
discussion of differences between the Germans and ourselves, which would only
play into the hands of Soviet propaganda. Meanwhile the News Department are
taking this general line in their guidance to the Press.
Wether or not any public statement is made, it seems desirable that the United
Kingdom High Commissioner should discuss the question frankly and privately
with Dr. Adenauer after General Robertson’s return on Tuesday from his visit to
Berlin1'' and before the debate in the German Parliament begins on Thursday15 16.
Here again it would seem best that General Robertson should not get involved in
any detailed discussion of the actual terms of the Franco-Saar agreements. The
Germans would like to get the Saar treated as a matter for discussion on a quadripartite
basis between the three Western Allies and themselves. It seems desirable
that we should as far as possible resist this claim and take our stand on the ground
that the French have every right to conclude such agreements with the Saar
Government and that they are not an appropriate subject for such quadripartite
discussion.
The main issue of course is whether or not these Saar conventions are to prevent
Germany’s entry into the Council of Europe. Here again it is most important that
we should not allow the Germans to get away with the impression, which is already
being reflected in their Press comment, that we are begging them to come in and
that they would be doing the Western European countries a great favour by doing
so.
A draft telegram to Wahnerheide is submitted.
{S w I Kirkpatrick} {D. Allen}
15 Zu den Kontakten im besagten Zeitraum vgl. die Schreiben Adenauers an Robertson vom 6.3.
und 9.3.1950 in: MENSING, Adenauer. Briefe 1949-1951, S. 175-177, sowie Anm. S. 487 f. Im
Anschluss an ein Treffen am 8.3.1950 ließ Robertson Adenauer eine Rede von Lord Henderson
im Oberhaus übermitteln: die Abkommen hätten nur einen vorläufigen Charakter und der
endgültige Status des Saarlandes könne nur durch den Friedensvertrag bestimmt werden. Vgl.
auch Adenauer, Erinnerungen, Bd. 1: 1945-1953, S. 309.
16 Zur Diskussion über die Saarverträge im Deutschen Bundestag am 10. März 1950 vgl.
Stenographische Berichte, Wahlperiode 1, S. 1555-1588; Adenauers Stellungnahme S. 1555-1560.
368