We stated that the boundaries of the territory, as also other portions of the German
frontier, would have to be settled by Quadri-Partite agreement.
We have agreed to the eventual integration of the Saar with France, but have in the
past always felt that there should be no piecemeal settlement of the German
frontiers and that in all cases final decision should await the peace settlement.
M. Bidault’s present proposals seem open to serious objections. The transfer on the
French frontier for customs purposes to the Eastern boundary of the Saar would
amount to fixing this frontier of Germany in a very definite manner and all that the
Peace Conference could possibly hope to do would be subsequently to endorse
such a decision. The French proposals can hardly be described as an „Interim
Measure“.
If the French unilaterally take action of this kind in their zone and we accepted
such action, although not Quadri-Partitely agreed, the Russians could in their turn
justify almost any unilateral organisation of their zone and any unilateral frontier
revisions in the East. I think we can take it for granted that officially, at any rate,
the Russians would dispute the French action and be on firm ground in so doing.
We should also have to consider the effect on other western European countries
with possible frontier claims as Flolland, Luxembourg and Belgium. We have told
them that any claims that they cared to submit would be considered by the Council
of Foreign Ministers in due course. It would be difficult to explain why we could
immediately agree to the French Saar claims.
Similarly as far as the Polish western frontier is concerned, the Americans have
again publicly stated that a final settlement can only be reached at the time of a
general Peace settlement. It would be difficult for them to take a separate line as far
as the Saar is concerned.
We and the Americans have always shared the view that if the Saar is integrated
with France the latter should readjust her reparations claims against Germany. The
assets so transferred, should be debited to France on reparation account. M. Bidault
makes no reference to any adjustment of this kind. The affect of any such frontier
rectification of the future level of industry planned for Germany would also have to
be considered.
If we agree now, this would mean the French have got a substantial gain prior to
the peace settlement and would undoubtedly when that time comes expect more.
The offer of the Saar would have lost its value as a bargain counter, as it would
already have been given away. If this readjustment is made now, the French would
have even less interest than they have shown up to date, in reaching any early
settlement of the German problem. They might be prepared to view with
equanimity a stalemate in the control of Germany affairs, but neither we nor the
Americans can afford a continued deterioration, as the result of the absence of Four
Power agreement in the economic and political conditions in Germany. It is
significant that M. Bidault makes no suggestion that in the event of our agreeing,
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